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Abstract—Due to the mobility of autonomous vehicles and
changing context through time, the constraints in safe driving
rules specification need to be irregularly updated for monitoring
the trajectory plan. This is not assumed in the Spatial-Temporal
Logic. This paper proposes a novel approach to build the spec-
ification of assume-guarantee constraints providing safe driving
rules related to time and space, in the context of Automated
Driving Assistance Systems (ADAS). The novelty lies in that the
specification adopts Multiform Logical Time to express the time
constraints and provides spatial events generated by interactions
on area trajectory for expressing space constraints. We propose
the safe specification patterns at a high-level that provide the
required expressiveness for safe driving rules. In these patterns,
logical time provides the power of parameterization to express
rules, before instantiation in low-level simulation contexts. The
specification finally could be used to generate monitors that are
executed on lower-level simulation engines with physical and
topological features.
Index Terms—Multiform Logical Time, Space, Mobile Cyber-
Physical System, Safe Specification Pattern
I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced Driving Assistance System (ADAS) is a typical
application of the Mobile Cyber-Physical System (MCPS).
ADAS employs various sensors at any time when the car
is running to perceive the surrounding environment, collect
data, identify, detect, and track static and dynamic objects,
thereby monitoring safe driving rules to provide safe driving
policies and effectively avoid traffic accidents. Unfortunately,
autonomous vehicles have already caused casualties [1]. How
to ensure the safety of driving rules for autonomous vehicles
with respect to time and space poses grand challenges.
There are already some researches on the specification
considering both space and time properties. Most of them
are spatial-temporal logics such as Spatio-temporal Logic for
closure space (STLCS) [2], Spatio-temporal logical with S4u
and Temporal Logical (STL) [3], and Signal Spatio-Temporal
Logic(SSTL) [4]. These logics are obtained by extending
temporal logic or spatial logic. Moreover, some researchers
focus on the safety assurances at lower-level. For example,
recently, Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) [5], a white-
box and interpretable mathematical model, is proposed by
Mobileye to validate the constraints of safe driving rules at
the low-level physical simulator, such as Carla [6], Apollo
[7], or Webots/SUMO [8]. However, due to the mobility
of autonomous vehicles, where elements (other cars, road
pieces, traffic signs) may dynamically enter and exit the scene,
the logic and low-level safety assurances cannot deal with
dynamically changing constraints in a unified way.
In this paper, we present a safety specification pattern, a
high-level abstraction of the safe driving rules, to build speci-
fications for different scenarios. The pattern is instantiated with
the trajectory plan, fresh scene as the input which is provided
by the low-level physical simulator. Due to the changing
scenes, the constraints in specifications are irregularly updated.
The constraints in safe driving rules specification relate to time
and space. To express the space constraints, we present area
trajectory (the area moves through continuous-time), and the
spatial events generated by interactions on area trajectories.
For time constraints, we adopt multiform logical time as the
parameters and extend CCSL (Clock Constraint Specification
Language) [9] expressions to express more complex time
constraints. Moreover, CCSL relies on the notion of logical
clocks [10], which are commonly used to specify both partial
orders and causal relationships on events. We thus combine
time constraints and space constraints with CCSL.
II. FRAMEWORK
Figure 1 presents the framework of our approach. We
provide a safe specification pattern to build safe driving rules
specification by instantiation with the fresh scene provided by
a low-level physical simulator. The observer could monitor the
trajectory plan with the specification, and then output whether
it is safe or not. The safe driving rules specification consists of
time constraints and space constraints, which are all expressed
with CCSL specifications. In the following, we first present
how to express the time constraints and space constraints in
the specification, and the safe specification pattern expression.
Then a simple case is used to show how to instantiate the
specification pattern with a scene. Finally we present how
to dynamically update the constraints on our monitor while
receiving a fresh scene.
TABLE I
SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS OF SPATIAL RELATIONS AND EVENTS
Type Syntax Semantics (Area A and B move through time, ε ∈ R+ is small enough)
Spatial Relations
A $ B ⇐⇒ ∀p ∈ U, p ∈ A⇐⇒ p ∈ B
A v B ⇐⇒ ∀p ∈ U, p ∈ B =⇒ p ∈ A
A B ⇐⇒ ∀p ∈ U,¬(p ∈ B ∧ p ∈ A)
A uB ⇐⇒ ∃p ∈ U, p ∈ A ∧ p ∈ B
Spatial Events
join(A,B) ⇐⇒ {t ∈ R+|A(t) B(t) ∧A(t+ ε) uB(t+ ε)}
disjoin(A,B) ⇐⇒ {t ∈ R+|A(t) uB(t) ∧A(t+ ε) B(t+ ε)}
include(A,B) ⇐⇒ {t ∈ R+|(A(t) uB(t) ∨A(t) B(t)) ∧A(t+ ε) v B(t+ ε)}
exclude(A,B) ⇐⇒ {t ∈ R+|A(t) v B(t) ∧ (A(t+ ε) uB(t+ ε) ∨A(t+ ε) B(t+ ε))}
Fig. 1. Overview of our framework
A. Safe Specification Pattern
Space and Time in Specification: The safe driving rules
specification involves the elements in the scene, which need
to be considered when constructing the specifications. In
our setting, a scene consists of a certain number of (active
elements) “players” such as cars, pedestrians, bikers, (passive
elements) “objects”, for instance, road lanes and crossings,
traffic signs, and a specific “ego car”.
Each of these generic element types define a number
of area zones of relevance for safety, such as ego car
includes: 1) front collision area; 2) front danger area; 3)
front warning area; and 4) front safe area (and similarly for
right, left, and back areas), denoted as typedirection(ego).
Then we present area trajectories in Definition 1 as these areas
move through continuous-time in simulation.
Definition 1: Given an area A, the area trajectory of A is a
total function A : R+ → 2U, where U is the universe space,
R+ represents the continuous (physical) time. A(t) is the area
A at time t.
To express the relations between these areas, we present spatial
relations, including equal ($), belongs to (v), disjoint (),
overlap (u). This allows us to define spatial events (join,
disjoin, include, exclude), generated by interactions between
area trajectories, to express transition between the relations,
as shown in Figure 2. The syntax and semantics of spatial
relations and events are as shown in Table I.
Fig. 2. Transitions between spatial relations
The specification also needs CCSL expressions to express
the more complex time-related requirements, such as “within
some seconds”, “after some seconds”, “after some meters”,
and so on. We thus extend two CCSL expressions withIn
and after.
- c1 , c2 withIn d, where d is multiform logical time. It
means if c2 ticks, then the next tick of c1 should occur within
the time d.
- c1 , c2 after d, where d is multiform logical time. It
means if c2 ticks, then the next tick of c1 should occur after
the time d.
Expression of Pattern: Based on the spatial events, we
can use logical time events in simple safe specification patterns
to express time and space constraints. A simple pattern uses
Esterel as the formalism expression, as shown in Table II.
In the pattern, there are three template events (logical clock),
StartCheck, Recover, and Failure, which are instantiated
with the scene as the input and CCSL expressions in the
low-level physical simulation context. It states that once a
StartCheck temporal condition is detected, initializing the
realization that there might be a latent problem to be mon-
itored, then one awaits for any of two subsequent events: a
positively resolving Recover event, stating that things went
back to normal, or a catastrophic Failure event, notifying a
potential collision of a timed-out delay for remaining too long
in the problematic model. In CCSL constraints, the pattern
states that Failure never occur, either StartCheck or Recover
ticks and StartCheck ticks before Recover.
B. Instantiation
In the ADAS context, we need to consider various scenarios
and elements, so we build predefined safe driving rules speci-
fication for each typical scenario or each type of player/object
TABLE II
SAFE SPECIFICATION PATTERN AND FORMALISM EXPRESSION
Safety Specification Pattern
Once StartCheck temporal condition is detected, a monitor is
initialized to detect possible latent problems. The monitor stops
either with a positive issue, when receiving the Recover event,
or a negative one, when receiving a Failure event (collision or
time-out, for instance).
Esterel formalism expression
await StartCheck then (awaitRecover) abort Failure
with the pattern by using CCSL specification to instance the
three template events. Thus, once receiving a fresh scene,
ADAS recognizes the type and areas of objects/players in
the scenario precisely, if the specification of this scene is
in predefined specifications, then it generates the space and
time constraints related to the objects/players and scenario
from the predefined specification. When there is no predefined
specification for the scene, ADAS need the machine learning
to help it build specification for the current scene and store into
the knowledge repository, and then generating the constraints.
Figure 3 presents a simple scenario. It shows that ego car
following the car front car. In this case, we consider three
states (safe, danger, collision) of ego car, and thus use two
type areas (danger and collision) to build the safe driving rules
specification for the front direction, which is expressed as:
Fig. 3. Example of safe distance
1.StartCheck = join(dangerfront(ego), front car)
2.Recover = disjoin(dangerfront(ego), front car)
, join(dangerfront(ego), front car)
withIn max resp time,
3.Failure = join(collison(ego), front car)
, join(dangerfront(ego), front car)
after max resp time,
which states that once the front danger area of ego car
overlaps with front car, then the front danger area should
disjoint within max response time, otherwise, a collision would
happen. In this specification, “the danger area of ego car
overlaps with another car” is the distance between the ego
car and the front cars is less than the safe distance. So the
“recovery” is the distance between the ego car and the front
car greater than the safe distance within a max response
time, otherwise, the ego car will collide with the front car.
When instantiation for this scene, ADAS needs to provide the
instance of the front car and ego car and compute the max
response time.
C. Monitor
The specification could be used to generate monitors that
are executed on lower-level simulation engines with physical
and topological features. With the areas and area trajectories
of the elements in the scene of ego car, we could generate
the spatial events. Therefore, we can use CCSL to combine
space constraints and time constraints and monitor whether
the trajectory plan is safe or not. Different from traditional
monitor generation, the constraints in the specification ir-
regularly updated requires automated monitor generation and
update. Traditionally, once receiving fresh scene information,
ADAS rebuilds everything to generate the constraints, but
it takes too many resources and is inefficient. Using the
updating constraints, our monitor only concerns about the
newly appeared elements instead of everything. Therefore, it
can be expected that the performance of our monitor would
be better.
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a safe specification pattern in
Esterel formalism expression to building specification of safe
driving rules in the context of automated driving. The pattern is
instantiated by CCSL specifications. The space constraints in
the specification are expressed with the primitive events/clocks
that are generated by encounters of well-defined area trajecto-
ries. We thus combine space and time constraints with CCSL,
thereby providing a unified approach to deal with time and
space constraints. The specification finally could be used to
generate monitors that are executed on lower-level simulation
engines with physical and topological features.
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